One of the topics of the international cooperation project CAPES- COFECUB entitled “Bare Nouns in Brazilian Portuguese: the syntax- semantics interface”1, coordinated by professor Carmen Dobrovie-Sorin in France and Roberta Pires de Oliveira in Brazil, is the distinction definite versus indefinite and its relation to bare noun phrases. The conference “Weak (In)Definiteness and Referentiality”, held in Florianópolis, SC, Brazil, in August 20 and 21, was a way of achieving a better understanding of the relations between (in)definiteness, referentiality and the interpretation of noun phrases. The conference was preceded by three mini-courses, all of which were directly linked to the main topic of the conference: Gregory Carlson talked about generics, Claire Beyssade discussed the solutions to weak definites, and Pascal Amsili lectured on presuppositions.2

Most of the papers in this special issue of Revista da ABRALIN were selected from the presentations during the Conference. Carlson et al, Aguilar-Guevara & Zwarts, and Beyssade’s papers were written in English for this journal, with the purpose of introducing the main theoretical trends. Since they will be published also in a special issue of Recherches Linguistique de Vincennes, organized by Claire Beyssade and Roberta Pires de Oliveira, in this volume we publish their Portuguese translations.

The theme of the conference, around which all the papers gravitate, is the idea of weak referentiality. Poesio (1994) was the first to identify a class of examples of definite descriptions, which he called “weak definite”, characterized by the absence of uniqueness; lacking, therefore, the hallmark characteristic of the definite phrase headed by the definite article. Other authors found different types of examples, rising at least two intermingled issues: do weak definites differ from “normal” definite phrases?; can all the examples of weak definiteness be unified, or are we dealing with heterogeneous phenomena? There is no consensus about either. In the first section, we introduce the examples that have being labeled “weak definite” so far. In the second section, we briefly summarize some of the most important solutions: the relational view, and the indefinite definite proposal, which groups two distinct approaches the pseudo-incorporation view, which appear in Carlson et al’s paper in this volume, and the kind solution, presented in Aguilar & Zwarts’ paper also in this volume. We briefly discuss two approaches the aim of which is a unified theory, one of which is Claire Beyssade’s proposal, one of the authors in this dossier. The third section briefly shows how the papers in this volume are linked to the theme of weak referentiality. In the conclusion, we balance the possibility of a unified theoretical approach.

The content of the definite article is one of the greatest themes in semantics. Classically, there are two approaches: the quantificational and the presuppositional views represented by Russell (1905) and Frege (1892) respectively, the fathers of modern logic. According to Russell the definite article does not denote an individual, but it is a quantifier. Thus, the nominal phrases in sentences in (1) are of the same semantic type, though they differ with respect to their contents:

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(1) a. The book is on the table.

b. A book is on the table.

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Without going into the details, in Russell’s account, (1.a) states that there is one and just one book that is on the table; whereas in (1.b) the existential quantification asserts that there is at least one book on the table. In Frege’s view, only (1.a) carries a presupposition – the presupposition that there is one and just one book –, and the nominal phrase is of type <e>, i.e. it denotes an individual – that particular book –, whereas in (1.b), the nominal phrase is quantificational, and the sentence receives the same treatment as in Russell. Be it one way or another, in both classical approaches, the definite article conveys (either semantically or pragmatically) that there is a unique referent that satisfies the definite noun phrase. Both theories need some sort of domain restriction to single out the referent.

An alternative analysis was proposed by Heim in her 1982 dissertation. In Heim’s theory the definite and the indefinite noun phrases are semantically equivalent since both introduce free variables. They differ with respect to the role they play in the discourse: indefinites introduce individuals into the discourse – in her terms, they open a new file card – whereas the definite recovers a referent in a file card that is already in the common ground, i.e. it is familiar. Thus, the definite phrase presupposes the referent of the definite phrase – i.e. it presupposes that there is a book in example (1.a) – and is an instruction for the hearer to find the file that matches the index. The notion of uniqueness is, then, derived by the fact that in order to interpret a definite phrase, the hearer must identify one particular file card.3

Poesio (1994) was the first to introduce a series of examples that challenges the view that the definite article conveys uniqueness; he labeled this class of examples “Weak Definites”. Carlson & Sussman (2005) and Carlson et alii (2006) introduced another type of examples, which they called “weak definite” or “indefinite definite”, and other authors came up with other examples, in particular Barker (2005), and Lyons (1999). We review some of these examples in the next sections.

Carlson et alii (2006) explicitly state that their theoretical account covers only the indefinite definite; Poesio (2004) and Barker (2005) claim that their approaches are explanations only for the relational or possessive definite. However, some authors have claimed that a unified theory is possible, among them Beyssade (in this volume), and Corblin (in press). In the first section, we briefly review Poesio’s and Barker’s solutions to the relational definite. The second section contrasts Carlson et alii (2006) and Aguilar-Guevara & Zwarts’ (2011) approaches to the indefinite definite. Finally, in the last section, sketches of unified theories are presented. The aim is not to present a full account of each proposal, but to enumerate them and to evaluate the possibility of a unified treatment for the weak definites.

The papers presented during the conference dealt with topics directly raised by weak definiteness: the three papers given in Portuguese translation in this issue are theoretical approaches to weak definites. Carlson et al’s paper, “Definidos fracos, uma forma de definitude: investigações empíricas”, discusses the results of different experiments. It shows that the normal definite description and the weak definite behave differently since only the weak definite denotes non-uniquely; moreover speakers interpret the weak definite as semantically enriched, and finally speakers interpret differently a weak definite and a weak indefinite – an indefinite phrase with a noun that raises weak readings when combined with a definite article. Thus, the definite article in a weak definite is not an expletive. Though the paper is mostly about the results of the experiments, which indeed call for an explanation, it also develops the authors’ theoretical explanation. Their main claim is that the issue is not so much about choosing between incorporation or kind analysis – suggesting that the noun in the weak definite may be kind denoting -, but about the role of the definite article. Aguilar-Guevara & Zwarts adopt the traditional view on the definite article, it presupposes familiarity and uniqueness, i.e. it denotes a particular individual. Carlson and his collaborators claim that the semantic composition of the weak definite is not the same as that of the normal definite, which applies to the noun directly and returns the only individual who has that property. In the weak definite, the semantic structure is as below:

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(19) a. DEF (V (N))

b. the (read’ (book’))

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The definite article combines with a VP, and it conveys the understanding that the situation denoted by the VP is familiar, in accordance with the results of the last experiment. No doubt there is a lot to be developed.

In “Definidos fracos denotam a espécie”, Aguilar-Guevara & Zwarts discuss in detail their approach to weak definites. They claim that the weak definite and the generic definite share the same structure in the sense that in both the noun denotes a kind. Weak definites normally appear in the internal position, whereas the definite generic seems to be more natural in the external position. There are, however, a number of issues that this proposal raises. Though the authors claim that the noun denotes a kind, they adopt some sort of incorporation to avoid the existential closure of the instantiations of the kind which would allow for anaphora. But, why should there be instantiation of the kind? If there were instantiations of the kind, we would expect the sentence in (20) to have an existential interpretation, paraphrased as “some horses entered in America with the Spanish Colonization. But (20) does not have such an interpretation:

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(20) The horse entered in America with the Spanish Colonization.

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Moreover, we have weak referentiality with the definite generic, as show in (21), but no semantic enrichment:

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(21) John photographed the lion for the first time in his life and so did Mary.

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Would there be the same mechanism to avoid access to the instantiations? How do we explain that there is no semantic enrichment when we have a definite generic? Finally, how do they explain the fact that anaphora with the kind is not possible:

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(22) John went to the hospital, and Mary did too. ??It is a place to recover.

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Beyssade in “Reabilitando a pressuposição de unicidade” introduces a new class of weak definites, as exemplified in (23), and presents her hypothesis that weak definites refer to types, not tokens, and that the definite article carries a presupposition of existence from which uniqueness is derived:

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(23) Jean s’est cassé le bras / la jambe / le doigt.

Jean Refl broke the arm / the leg / the finger

‘Jean broke his arm / leg / finger’

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It is interesting to notice that some of her examples of body parts work in Brazilian Portuguese – for instance, lavar o braço (wash the arm), which is not allowed in French. Types are intensional entities, that denote singletons in a taxonomic structure – taxonomic structures, according to the author, are not lattice structures, a point that need clarification –, and the members of which are indistinguishable. Thus, though a type is related to its tokens, which are unique, they are also indistinguishable. According to this approach, when a type denotation is involved the distinction between definite and indefinite is erased in the sense that using one or the other gives the same truth conditions. However, this is a prediction that is not verified by the experiments presented in Carlson et alii (this volume). Their last experiment shows that speakers interpret differently a weak definite and a weak indefinite. Moreover, it is unclear why only certain nouns can denote the type, since all nouns should have, at least in principle, a type denotation. Thus, it is difficult to explain why read the newspaper raises a weak reading, but read the maganize does not, unless that is lexically marked. Moreover, there is no obvious way of deriving the enriched meanings, except by stipulation. Finally, according to her, if ‘the NP’ denotes more than one N, then the nominal phrase does not denote a token. Thus, by inference it denotes a type. However, there are two cases of presuppositional failure: if there are no individuals, or if there are more than one individual. How are we to differentiate this last case from the type reading?

The other papers in this volume are organized concentrically from the weak definite core. Donazzan analyses cases of weak definites in Italian and argues for a non-ambiguity semantics for the strong and the weak definites, relying on Roberts’ notion of weak familiarity. She shows that there is a class of weak definites in Italian, but more importantly some of the examples do not engender enriched meanings, though they are characterized by prototypicality, that is, they are lexically restricted:

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(24) Esco a bere il caffè al bar. (example (14))

I-go out to drink the coffee at-the bar

‘I’m going out to have a coffee at the bar.’

Though (24) is prototypical because the weak reading only happens with caffè (coffee), it shows no semantic enrichment. Thus, semantic enrichment is not a necessary feature of weak definites. Donazzan explores Roberts’ idea of weak familiarity to claim that in all cases uniqueness is preserved. As we have already mentioned, that may not be the case; weak definites do not seem to refer uniquely, as Roberts herself makes clear in her paper with respect to the relational definites; but even if we restrict the analysis to the indefinite definite it is not clear that uniqueness is preserved (at least at the object level).

Basso & Vogt look at the issue of weak definiteness from a very original point of view: demonstratives. The authors wonder whether there are weak demonstratives; i.e. demonstratives which lack uniqueness, in the sense that they may be truthfully used in a situation to denote more than one individual. They come up with examples such as:

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(25) John went to this doctor, and Mary did too. (pointing to one specialty in a list of medical specialties)

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They show that the weak demonstrative passes the sloppy reading test, since John and Mary may have gone to different doctors of the same specialty. They also carry enriched meanings: John and Mary want medical treatments. Besides being a clear presentation of Aguilar- Guevara & Zwarts kind proposal, their paper turns out to be an argument in favor of this analysis, since they show that the only possibility for (25) is to interpret the demonstrative as a sub-kind (a specialty). The fact that the demonstrative cannot refer to the maximal entity is one of its characteristic; the relevant point is that this non maximal entity has to be a sub-kind. It is unclear whether we need the kind theory to explain this data, although it certainly shows that the N in a weak construction seems to denote a kind. Carlson & Sussman (2005), Carlson et alii (2006), and Carlson et alii (in this volume) anchor their theoretical claims about the weak definites on psycholinguistic experiments. Zielke investigates the behavior of second language learners of European Spanish, by speakers of Turkish and German, with respect to the so called “extremely reading”, which was introduced in the literature by Lyons (1999). In (26), we have an example of the extremely reading in Spanish:

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(26) En esta librería hay los mejores libros.

in this book store there-are the best books.

‘In this book store there are the best books.’

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The interest of the paper lies on the fact Turkish has no definite determiner, thus there is no formal distinction between the definite and the indefinite versions of the there-construction. The hypothesis was, then, that Turkish learners would have more difficulties interpreting the Spanish extremely reading examples then German learners. This hypothesis was not confirmed. In fact, both German and Turkish speakers had difficulties with the extremely reading. It is unclear whether the extremely reading belongs to the class of weak definites. As shown on table 1 above, the extremely reading presupposes uniqueness, though not familiarity. Thus, we need a better understanding of this phenomenon.

Semantic incorporation is commonly invoked as the explanation for bare nouns, in particular their role in languages where their use is restricted. One of the main features of semantic incorporation is number neutrality, which, in Carlson’s model explains the lack of uniqueness of the weak definite. Relying on an extensive and original investigation of both oral and written corpora in Greek, Lazaridou-Chatzigoga & Alexandropoulou investigate bare singulars in this language to conclude, going against the strict view on incorporation, that they are not number neutral, but singular (in accordance with Dayal’s recent (2011) analysis of Hindi), and that they are arguments – classically, incorporated nominal phrases are considered referentially weak. Here is an example from their corpora that supports their claim against number neutrality:

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(27) Ehi ghamo sto dhiplano horio. #Enan

has wedding in.the next village one

stin eklisia ke enan sto dhimarhio.

in.the church and one in.the town.hall

‘There is a wedding in the next village. One is in the

church and one in the town hall.’

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If ghamo (wedding) were number neutral, the sequence should be acceptable, but it is not. Relying on the empirical support of their corpus analysis, their paper challenges the strict view of incorporation, a major theoretical contribution. The challenge is to explain how bare singulars can be at the same time arguments and semantically incorporated.

Lee’s paper investigates the distinction between definite and indefinite noun phrases, looking at numeral noun phrases in Korean. Korean is a classifier language and the numeral may occupy two different positions: the noun may precede a numeral classifier consisting of a numeral expression and a classifier as in (28.a); or the noun may appear after a numeral classifier with a genitive marker, (28.b):

(28) a. [haksyang [sye meyng]]-i o-ass-ta.

student _______ 3 Cl-Nom _______ come-Past-Decl

b. [[sye meyng]-uy haksyang]-i o-ass-ta.

3 Cl-Gen ___ student-Nom ___ come-Past-Decl

‘Three students came.’

Traditionally these different number constructions were associated with definite and indefinite readings, respectively. The author shows that this is not the case, though both appear in there-construction. The post numeral classifier construction, where the numeral appears after the noun, may receive definite and indefinite interpretations; whereas the pre numeral classifier construction is definite.

The last paper is Foltran & Rodrigues’ discussion about the syntax- semantic of copular clauses in Brazilian Portuguese in which the predicate exhibits the unmarked form for gender and number, in spite of the feminine and feminine plural forms of subjects:

(29) a. Maria bêbada é chato.

Maria drunk-fem is boring-Neutral

b. Crianças é divertido.

Children is funny-Neutral

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The authors argue that in (29) we have two different structures: (29.a) is a small clause, the subject of which is a situation, which asks for a neutral agreement; whereas in (29.b) the subject is a DP which lacks the agreement features. They contribute to the discussion because structures like (29.b) must be indefinite.

The notion of weak definites is not self evident as the examples discussed in the papers during the conference clearly testify. One of the goals of the conference was precisely to clarify this notion, as a first step towards evaluating the best theoretical description. The topic of weak definites, and its relation to weak referentiality, is a fairly recent one and that is why some of the basic questions are still open, the most important of them being the possibility of unifying theoretically all the structures and examples discussed in the papers of this volume.

The only feature that apparently unifies all the examples that constitute the so-called “weak definites” is, from a descriptive point of view, the lack of the presupposition of uniqueness in the use of a definite description, except from the “extremely reading”, which lacks familiarity. But notice that some proposals – Corblin (in press) and Donazzan (this volume) – rescue the idea of uniqueness. So, what exactly characterizes the weak definite? Probably, the answer to this question leads to a unified or a non-unified theory of weak definites, and we hope that the papers here collected illuminate the search for such answers.